

Colonial dreams and nightmares: British and French perceptions of republican policies in Spanish Morocco (1931-6).

I. Introduction.

The colonial policies of the Spanish Second Republic in Morocco (1931-6) have received fresh attention in contemporary scholarship, owing to historians' continuing interest in the background of the military rebellion of July 1936, which led to the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. As a result, new debates on republican initiatives in the Moroccan Protectorate have emerged, bringing to light a relatively unexplored subject in previous literature.¹

Current discussions focus on three main questions. Firstly, there is ongoing controversy on whether a more responsive attitude to Moroccan nationalists would have gained the Second Republic their crucial support in the events of July 1936, and what consequences might have resulted from it. Secondly, there is debate regarding the limited success of republican projects in Morocco and whether this was mainly due to inconsistency on the part of the government or to opposition and resistance within the Army of Africa. Thirdly, the reasons underlying the successful recruitment of native Moroccans into Franco's forces are still open to contention: a consequence of republican failures in Morocco for some historians, while others see it as a result of factors over which the Republic had no control.²

Most historians agree, in the first instance, that there was little that the republican government could do in order to respond effectively to nationalist aspirations in the Spanish Protectorate. Pressure from other colonial partners (particularly France) and international commitments precluded any serious attempts in that direction. Even if some degree of self-government had been conceded at the time, it is questionable whether political concessions would have been of any consequence in the events of July 1936. The nationalists' influence

in the Spanish Protectorate was restricted to a few areas (the capital city of Tetouan, mainly) and their attitude would have had little or no effect in the vast countryside, where recruitment of the rebels was most successful.³

Historians have also examined the high expectations and the limited results of republican policies in the Protectorate. Whereas some have defended their consistency, others have conceded that domestic conflict and lack of resources did not allow for a coherent approach to Moroccan issues.⁴ In other scholars' views, colonial reforms were crucially undermined by hostile attitudes within the army, particularly among Africanist officers, who felt threatened by republican progressive legislation and reacted to protect their prerogatives.⁵

A more consensual approach prevails on the third question. The reasons for the successful recruitment of native Moroccans into insurgent units are considered to be of an economic nature, rather than any identification with the rebels' cause. The provision of pay and supplies in a context of dreadful economic conditions and the strict military control imposed by the rebels appear as a powerful enough reason for most historians to explain the native Moroccans' choices, although recent publications have suggested alternative motivations among the recruits, linked to the attitudes of the Sultan representatives vis-a-vis the rebellion.⁶

A common feature in this discussion appears to be the predominant use of Spanish sources and the general reliance on Spanish archives to support these opposing views. Whereas the General Archive of the Administration (Archivo General de la Administración) in Alcalá de Henares, the General Military Archive (Servicio Histórico Militar), in Madrid, or the National Historical Archive (Archivo Histórico Nacional), also in Madrid, have been often visited by historians, foreign archives have been generally overlooked, except perhaps for insights into British and French reactions in the face of events in July 1936.⁷ In contrast,

this article suggests that the comments, opinions and estimations of British and French representatives in Morocco are valuable sources for appraising republican reform in the Spanish Protectorate, and may offer a crucial contribution to the previous debates, particularly regarding the effectiveness and repercussions of republican colonial policies.

Certainly, some precautions are necessary in this regard. British and French colonial representatives (consuls, military attachés, advisors) were not disinterested spectators, far from it. They acted as delegates of countries with lasting and strongly held priorities in the Western Mediterranean, often conflicting with Spanish ambitions in the region. Rivalry between French and Spanish colonial authorities and diplomatic friction between Britain and Spain (mainly over Gibraltar and Tangier), were long-standing features in this landscape. Providing strictly impartial information, therefore, was probably not to be entirely expected from such witnesses.⁸

Nevertheless, considering them as mere mouthpieces of the political establishment, who simply replicated official directives and national stereotypes for political consumption, may be equally misleading. Colonial delegates were obviously supposed to toe the government line, but private digressions and personal views were not uncommon in their reports and, on occasion, delivered surprising conclusions. Revealing portrayals, uncompromising remarks and critical observations abound in their surviving correspondence, suggesting interesting perspectives to the aforementioned discussions.

Three areas of interest to historians trying to unravel republican colonial policies in Morocco have been identified in line with the previous discussion: a more conciliatory approach to Moroccan nationalist aspirations; an expansion of civilian responsibilities (in parallel with substantial budget cuts and reduction of military units) and a decided attempt to seal the Protectorate off from peninsular events. Against the backdrop of the post-1929

economic crisis, the government of the Spanish Second Republic sought to reverse the long-running decline of civil authority in Morocco and aimed at dismantling the privileges granted to the Army of Africa by the previous dynastic regime – the Bourbon Restoration (1875-1923) - and the Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera (1923-30). The process was far from straightforward and fraught with weakness, defiance and inconsistency. Foreign officials did not miss such developments and offered penetrating insights that will be explored in the pages that follow.⁹

II. Native policy and nationalist aspirations.

One of the most controversial aspects of the early republican policies in Morocco was a more favourable attitude towards Moroccan nationalists. Historians have generally regarded this friendly disposition as a feeble attempt on the part of the young Republic to earn popularity by showing sympathy to self-rule aspirations, particularly in Tetouan, the capital of the Spanish Zone. According to this view, the republican government had no real intention of pursuing radical native policies, but felt the need to display some empathy towards nationalist ideals. This led to early (and ineffective) promises to nationalist figures who visited Spain after the proclamation of the Republic and to a generally neutral and benevolent approach to nationalist concerns. Together with more lenient views on censorship, it encouraged the desire to interfere as little as possible in local affairs and to grant nationalists full freedom to participate in public life. Despite good intentions and occasional successes, historians have remarked that such initiatives did not entail major changes and were ultimately restricted to speeches and discourses that fizzled out with little consequence.¹⁰

It is worth noticing, however, that foreign observers adopted a rather different view. For a start, several of them highlighted that republican overtures departed significantly from previous policies followed in the Spanish protectorate. The British consul general at Tangier,

Sir Hugh Gurney, noted that colonial authorities had traditionally limited themselves to heavy-handed responses to Moroccan demands, particularly during the dictatorship of general Primo de Rivera (1923-30). Far from an irrelevant or tentative change of direction, he warned that the 'easy going', 'relaxed', 'lenient', 'indulgent' and 'collaborative' inclination observed in Spanish officials from April 1931 could have lasting and profound repercussions.¹¹ Spanish reluctance to deal with a 'potentially disturbing' influence in the Protectorate, particularly in Tetouan, considered the hotbed of Moroccan nationalism, was heavily criticised by the British consul at the city, George Monck-Mason, who warned against nationalist activities championed by local notables such as Abdelkhalek Torres and Amir Bennuna.¹²

Certainly, apart from a generally neutral and conciliatory attitude towards Moroccan nationalists, British and French representatives did not find many initiatives or concrete projects to report on. They did not hesitate to warn, however, that this was more than a casual or irrelevant change of direction of an early republican government seeking popularity and that the repercussions could be lasting and profound.¹³ Two main concerns were raised: firstly, the effects that such 'tolerant tendencies' could have on Moroccan nationalism as a whole and, secondly, the difficulties that they would inevitably create for the French authorities in Morocco. In the first case, the British consul at Tetouan, George Monck-Mason, lamented the short-sightedness of the republican government and its apparent lack of awareness of international commitments.¹⁴ In the second, the French plenipotentiary minister to Morocco, Urbain Blanc, deplored the lack of consultation and the unilateral character of such initiatives. The Spanish authorities, he concluded, seemed to be oblivious to the difficulties that their native policies were bound to create to the French administration and the inevitable consequences that would follow in the Spanish Zone too.¹⁵

The pragmatics of a more informal and laid-back approach to Moroccan concerns were not lost to foreign sources. The British consul general at Tangier, Sir Hugh Gurney, admitted in 1932 that if Spanish treatment of natives seemed to ‘err on the side of indulgence’, it also led ‘to a comfortable sort of everyday modus vivendi which is not to be found in every colony.’ In comparative terms, he noticed, the prevailing feeling among natives in the Spanish zone was that they were ‘unquestionably better off under the good-natured, somewhat lax Spanish officials than under a more efficient French administration.’¹⁶ A similar impression was shared by the US consul at Tangier, Donald F. Bigelow, for whom the local population was ‘surprisingly well-disposed’ towards the republican regime and disinclined to revolt against its authority.¹⁷

In the long run, however, British reports predicted that such policies would hamper the colonial effort in Morocco. Notwithstanding the benefits derived from keeping France ‘holding the baby’ of Moroccan nationalism, the British consul at Tetouan, George Monck-Mason, reiterated that such uncooperative attitudes on the part of the Spanish administration would inevitably invite difficulties for their French neighbours and for themselves. In the context of a growing pan-Islamic sentiment in Arab countries in the aftermath of the Great War, he considered this attitude to be irresponsible.¹⁸ French sources, on their part, promptly established a correlation between lenient attitudes in the Spanish Zone and their own difficulties managing nationalist unrest. Street disturbances during the first anniversary of the Berber Dahir - a fiercely opposed decree approved in May 1930 by the French colonial administration aiming at providing separate legislation to Arab and Berber populations - provided the French Resident General in Morocco, Lucien Saint (1929-33), with an early opportunity to hint at these parallels. In his view, the unrestrained propaganda of Tetuani nationalists was a crucial factor in the disturbances that took place in the cities of Fes and Rabat in May 1931.¹⁹ The ever-threatening presence of German agents, who, despite having

been excluded from Morocco after the First World War, continued to operate in the Spanish Zone, was also believed to benefit from these lax policies, much to the frustration of French officials. 'It is indeed through the inhabitants of the Spanish zone or the zone of Tangier', concluded the French minister of home affairs, Albert Sarrault, 'that German influence is exerted on French Morocco.'²⁰ Similar views were reported by the French ambassador to Spain, Jean Herbette, who not only regretted government apathy in this regard, but warned that Spain had as much to lose as France from the unchecked activities of German agents.²¹

The limitations and inconsistencies of Spanish policies were not, however, overlooked by foreign observers. Reports from the French Directorate of Native Affairs often noted that conciliatory native policies displayed in the cities of Ceuta, Melilla and Tetouan, were completely ignored in neighbouring rural areas, where the local population was kept under strict surveillance.²² This underlying assumption of a clear divide between the Arab element (dominant in the cities and thought to be more accommodating) and the Berber peoples (preeminent in the countryside and believed to be of a wilder disposition) was also questioned. The British general consul at Rabat, William S. Edmonds, remarked that this dichotomy did not correspond with the situation in the Spanish zone, where urban centres in the Spanish zone were swarming with Berber work-seekers coming from as far as the Rif and the Atlas Mountains.²³ Other inconsistencies in the apparently accommodating, all-permitting attitude of the Spanish authorities were also highlighted. Although Tetuani nationalists were allowed to express their views more freely and to meet with the Sultan's representative - the Khalifa Moulay el-Hassan (1924-56) -, their contacts with the Sultan himself - Mohammed V (1927-61) - were strictly prohibited. The belief that the Khalifa of Tetouan was an autonomous political figure rather than a representative of the Sultan's authority in the Spanish Zone, a misinterpretation of the Franco-Spanish Treaty (1912) widely shared among Spanish authorities, was thought to explain this paradox.²⁴

Spanish conciliatory policies, on the other hand, had little chance of materialising. Early promises made to nationalist figures who visited Spain after the proclamation of the Second Republic - a well-publicised tour by nationalist leaders Sidi Mohamed Buhalai, Sidi Ahmed Cailan, Sidi Abdelsalam and Sidi el Levady, which included an audience with the president of the Republic, Niceto Alcalá-Zamora, in June 1931 - soon became simple window-dressing in foreign correspondence. Despite concerns raised by republican attitudes towards Moroccan nationalists, French reports noticed that, for all the official literature and grand public speeches, crucial nationalist demands remained largely unaddressed in 1933. These included equal treatment for European settlers and Moroccans, freedom of the press and of association, new schooling and health programmes for the local population and reform of the indigenous justice system.²⁵ The ‘unquestioning colonial commitment’ promised by the Second Republic (defended by some historians - and disputed by many others on account of its failed native policies -), was thus challenged by foreign sources.²⁶

In explaining the reasons for these ‘misguided’ policies, French representatives held the republican government mainly responsible.²⁷ The causes they identified, however, differed from those noted by most contemporary historians. Whereas the latter often refer to well-intentioned but misinformed initiatives and sound projects that did not have enough time to yield results, the former pointed at other shortcomings.²⁸ These included a deep-seated anticlericalism, which occasionally embraced Pan-Islamist rhetoric; the inability to perceive the correlation between Moroccan issues and the larger international scenario and a hasty and often ill-advised effort to reverse previous dictatorial policies.²⁹ The French ambassador in Madrid, Jean Herbette, also noted the pernicious influence of lobbies with vested interests in Morocco and the lack of expertise of cabinet members.³⁰ In addition, an increasingly deteriorating domestic scenario, according to the French consul at Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres, did not allow the government ‘to give Moroccan affairs either the time they require or

the solid orientation that is imperative.³¹ Fierce criticism in the Spanish Parliament, to which the republican government did not respond convincingly, was also highlighted as a main difficulty. According to French reports, the Spanish High Commissioners soon restricted themselves to conducting native policies in such a manner that would not provoke further censure in Madrid, this becoming their primary concern, since they did not know what to expect from their own government.³²

While acknowledging the domestic turbulence and practical difficulties owing to lack of resources, British and French delegates also focused their attention on the Spanish High Commissioners, Luciano López Ferrer (1931-3), Juan Moles Ormella (1933-4) and Manuel Rico Avelló (1934-6). Far more critical in their views than accounts by contemporary historians, their reports portrayed them as unsuitable candidates with limited expertise in colonial affairs and contradictory attitudes towards Moroccan nationalists.³³ López Ferrer, a career diplomat with a long history of service in the Protectorate, was described as a weak character, indecisive and distrustful of Moroccan nationalists, who alienated local elites by making ill-judged appointments to native offices. Moles Ormella, a Catalan lawyer and former Civil Governor at Barcelona, was seen as a more reliable figure, who, however, pursued a hostile native policy, banning nationalist publications and restricting nationalist activities.³⁴ Rico Avelló, an Asturian lawyer and right-centre politician who had held the post of Home Secretary in 1933, was viewed as a more tolerant official, who ultimately failed to co-opt Tetouani nationalist leaders into the colonial administration.³⁵

British and French officials highlighted discrepancies and changes of mood and inclinations in republican native policies which, lacking continuity or coherence, failed to build up any trust and long-term rapport between Spanish authorities and the Sultan's representatives.³⁶ Such relations were considered to be 'non-existent' during López Ferrer's tenure, 'marginal' during Moles' administration and only initially warm during Rico Avelló's

residence.³⁷ Lack of communication, distrust among Moroccan nationalists and disorientation of the local population were mentioned as inevitable outcomes of the situation. ‘A real confusion exists in the spirit of the indigenous population in Tetouan’, explained the French military attaché at Tangier, Captain Robert Cottrelle. ‘The Spanish authorities constantly modify their native policies. They keep destroying at night what they have so painstakingly built in the morning.’³⁸

Core assumptions of republican native policies, frequently overlooked by historians, were also heavily criticised. British and French representatives took early notice, for instance, of the speeches made by the president of the Republic, Alcalá-Zamora, during his first official visit to Morocco in 1933. He addressed Moroccan people in Tetouan as ‘blood brothers’ and ‘equal partners’, terms that raised applause from local subjects, but bewildered foreign officials and dismayed European settlers present at the occasion.³⁹ Such a speech, considered to be thoroughly inappropriate, was not taken lightly in British and French reports.

‘I cannot help expressing my conviction’, explained the British consul at Tetouan, George Monck-Mason, soon after Alcalá-Zamora’s visit, ‘that the present Spanish policy of treating the Moors as their equals is mistaken and may be dangerous’. ‘They are supported in this mistaken idea’, he continued, ‘by certain elements of the administration and encouraged in their belief of the equality between Spaniard and Moor by the lack of a definite policy’.⁴⁰ Similar views were expressed by the French consul at Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres, for whom Spanish-Moroccan fraternity could figure ‘in an electoral speech’, but it was not ‘an administrative doctrine.’⁴¹ Acknowledging that there was ‘something to be said for such a policy, since the Spanish race is without doubt more akin to the Moor of the Spanish Protectorate than any other European race’, the US consul at Tangier, Donald F. Bigelow, also deplored the fundamental miscalculations in such beliefs.⁴² Officials in London and Paris

also took a dim view of such approaches. According to Charles N. Stirling, Head of the African Department of the Foreign Office, 'the Moors' were, generally, a 'backward race', 'not remarkable like the Chinese or Japanese for industry and intelligence' and espoused to a religion 'naturally opposed to modernism'. Such 'enlightened' policies as the ones the Spaniards pretended to adhere to were therefore irremediably doomed.⁴³ For French Information Services, republican speeches were bound to be 'dangerous in a country where evolution has been too sudden and rapid and where it would seem prudent not to yield to the still unreasonable claims of the younger generations.'⁴⁴ The feeling that the Moors had 'little love for the Spaniards and only as much respect as they are forced to give' added to these objections, questioning the claims of common historical heritage intimated by Spanish officials aiming to win over the Moroccan population.⁴⁵ Such allegations, according to the French High Commissioner, Henri Ponsot (1933-6), ignored the secular confrontation between both countries and the enduring hostility of the Moroccan masses towards the Spaniards.⁴⁶

This 'unfortunate tendency on the mass of the Spanish residents in the Zone to regard the Moors as their blood brothers', in the words of the British consul at Tetouan, George Monck-Mason, may admit other interpretations.⁴⁷ As colonial studies have largely established, Spanish imagery of the 'Moroccan Other' was more akin to images of shared historical and ethnic backgrounds than to the cultural, historical and racial distinctions, more prevalent in European Orientalism.⁴⁸ This 'misguided idealism', as it was termed in foreign reports, could be then seen as a peculiar product of Spanish 'Marroquism', as several authors have argued.⁴⁹ However, it is also worth noticing that Spanish official discourse on Moroccan native policy, at least in the realm of doctrine, appeared to correspond almost literally with the clauses of the Treaty of 1912, where protective powers were supposed to prepare local population for self-rule. This general principle was nevertheless ignored by foreign observers

when assessing the merits and demerits of Spanish colonial policies. ‘No wish to associate the Moors with themselves’; ‘direct control of all branches of administration’ and ‘less and less attention to the possibility of preparing the Moors once again to rule their own country’ were, for instance, common denunciations of French native practice in British reports. Such reports often lamented that Morocco was being treated by the French ‘entirely as a colony’ and not as a protectorate.⁵⁰ When appraising republican native policies, however, references to the international agreements conspicuously disappeared from British reports, being replaced by concerns about rivalries between colonial partners. In those rare moments when Spanish officials made entirely clear what their native policy was meant to achieve, French and British representatives were (or feigned to be) startled, despite the almost verbatim correspondence of Spanish claims with the Treaty of Protectorate clauses. When Guillermo Moreno Calvo, Spanish deputy minister of foreign affairs, implied in 1935 that the Spanish native policies had always aimed at ‘bringing the protégé to the point where his intellectual level will allow him to hold public offices in a situation of equal rights and duties between protectors and protégés’, he was heavily criticised ‘for identifying his views with those of the Moroccan nationalists.’⁵¹ Similar observations were addressed to the High Commissioner, Rico Avelló, in 1936, after he affirmed the previous year that Spain would be in Morocco for ‘the time necessary for the emancipation of the natives’.⁵²

It could be argued then that republican conciliatory native policies in Morocco and the principles they upheld were criticised not so much for their disregard of historical experience and blatant inconsistencies, which were evident, but principally because they appeared to undermine the basic consensus among colonial partners and, crucially, the sacred tenet of the superiority of the white races over colonised peoples. This fundamental apprehension was shared both by British observers and their French counterparts, who equally denounced

republican native policies as threatening to provoke ‘the split of the European bloc’ in Morocco and took pains to make this clear to Spanish authorities.⁵³

In sum, British and French officials concluded, republican native policies ended up by disappointing young Tetouani nationalists and confirming their belief that the Spanish Republic was not entirely committed to the colonial venture. Moreover, lack of direction and consistency in republican projects also nurtured their hopes that Spain could be forced to abandon Morocco if further problems developed, a prospect that, although dismissed by most historians, still alarmed the French authorities in 1936.⁵⁴

The belief that a friendly disposition towards Moroccan nationalists would gain the republican government their support in the event of an anti-republican uprising in Morocco was another fundamental miscalculation of these policies, according to French reports. Far from it, lenient and permissive attitudes encouraged subversive and occasionally violent behaviour among nationalists, further undermining the position of Spain as a colonial power. ‘They hoped to win the sympathies of the Muslim world in this manner’, summed up a report issued by the French Ministry of War in 1933. ‘In fact, they have not succeeded but in giving another lease to the nationalist movement, of xenophobic tendencies, which is directed in the first place against Spain.’⁵⁵ According to the same sources, Tetouani nationalists had already lost faith in the Second Republic in early 1936, due to an inconclusive response to their demands on the part of the Popular Front government and a generally indifferent attitude to their plight. The tacit support that, after some hesitation, nationalist leaders finally lent to the uprising in 1936, confirmed French delegates in their criticism of republican native policies.⁵⁶

III. From military to civilian protectorate

The Spanish Second Republic deserves credit, according to most historians, for the transformation of a military-dominated Protectorate into a civilian-controlled area, where

liberal principles gradually gained ground against authoritarian inclinations, from the early 1930s. It is generally accepted that Morocco had become a hotbed of Spanish militarism, where rising careers had been made under the influence of an all-pervading belligerent culture, particularly in units of La Legión and Regulares. Whether such a military culture emerged as a result of metropolitan neglect or by virtue of rampant 'Africanism' remains a disputed question.⁵⁷ Less controversial for contemporary historians is the claim that the Second Republic was determined from the start to confront the influence of the army in Morocco, successfully managing to do so, despite reluctant attitudes from colonial authorities and downright opposition from anti-republican officers. Only the anti-democratic uprising of July 1936, runs the argument, put an end to such a promising transformation.⁵⁸

In many ways, foreign observers agreed with these claims. A transition from military to civilian rule was considered timely and necessary, owing to the tranquillity of the Spanish zone. According to the US consul general at Tangier, Maxwell Blake, the pacification of the country was so complete in 1932, that it was 'difficult' to realize that so short a time had elapsed since the military campaigns in the mid-1920s.⁵⁹ Other reports also suggested that inevitable cuts in the Spanish colonial budget after the financial crash of 1929 would not have drastic consequences in the territory, due to the prevailing stability. Thus, republican administrative reforms, were considered to be 'needed' and would 'become possible after a successful pacification.'⁶⁰

The same sources, however, emphasized that the new civil authorities appointed by the republican government would need to perform their task to the utmost of their abilities in order to implement changes without compromising order and security. Reasons ranging from the fragile administrative structures to the pivotal role played by the military in keeping the Moroccan population under check were mentioned.⁶¹ French observers stressed that much of what had been achieved in the Spanish Zone in the way of pacification was the result of

military expertise, particularly on the part of the units of military controllers ('Intervenciones'), whose contacts with local Caids and chiefs had been crucial in maintaining order among the tribes ('kabilas'). They warned against hurried initiatives that could undermine the role of these units and the prestige of their most relevant figures.⁶² The French consul at Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres, also recommended a careful approach of financial cutbacks, considering it imperative that the new legislation provided a general rebalancing and redirection of Spanish investment in the Protectorate.⁶³

The administrative changes that made their way to the pages of the 'Official Bulletin of the Spanish Protectorate' were, therefore, well received. Four of them were particularly applauded: the appointment of a civilian as High Commissioner; the setting up of a cabinet to assist him in his duties; the recruitment of a parallel corps of civilian controllers ('interventores civiles') and the attempt to improve civil-military relations in Morocco.⁶⁴ The dominant role that civilian authorities would assume both in the High Commissionership and in the Directorate of Native Affairs - which together with the Directorate of Civil Administration and the Directorate of Colonial Troops were the pillars of Spanish administration -, was similarly praised, prompting a cautious optimism among French officials.⁶⁵ Simplification in the military structure and a reduction in colonial troops, which would annually save 150 million pesetas to the Spanish Treasury, were also commended.⁶⁶

Such favourable impressions, however, were dissipated in the following years for a variety of reasons. The hasty pace of the reforms introduced, which within six months had made a tabula rasa of the previous administration, was one of them. The noticeable lack of credentials of new appointees and continuous changes in colonial legislation were other reasons for concern which made British and French representatives apprehensive. The replacement of all the heads of colonial Directorates soon after the establishment of the new republican government (Colonel Osvaldo Capaz in Native Affairs, Teodomiro Aguilar in

Civil Administration and General Francisco Gómez-Jordana Sousa in Troops of Occupation), was seen as rushed and imprudent. The credentials of new incumbents (Colonel Gerardo Sánchez-Monje, Consul Emilio Zapico and General Miguel Cabanellas, respectively), political affinities serving as grounds for promotion and frequent changes and ‘capricious’ allocation of administrative duties were also deplored.⁶⁷ According to a report by the French Ministry of War in 1933, an ‘impulsive’ drive to renew cadres of colonial administration, regardless of merit and expertise, indicated that ‘experience to look for and apply the most sensible solution’ was ‘missing in the new, constantly renewed, personnel of the Spanish Protectorate.’⁶⁸

Unenthusiastic appraisals of Spanish High Commissioners and their advisors added to previous misgivings. For all his experience in colonial matters, López Ferrer was regarded as an unsuitable figure, owing to his political past - he was a relative of the conservative early 20th century Spanish politician Antonio Maura - and his lack of leadership as High Commissioner. Challenging the views of historians, French reports of the time sneered at his attempts to attract public attention by indulging in long-winded speeches about the ‘Protectorado civil’ and lamented his inability to surround himself with competent advisors.⁶⁹ Juan Moles Ormella, López Ferrer’s replacement, did not fare much better in these reports. A similar lack of experience and political skills added ‘further confusion’ to a still fragile civil administration during his ten-month residence (February-December 1933). Although generally perceived as honest, reliable and a favoured figure in Madrid, French sources did not see in him the ‘practical and effective political insider’ claimed by some historians, and soon pronounced him to be an unlikely candidate to complete a successful transformation of the Spanish administration.⁷⁰ Having never visited Morocco before (in fact, having never been abroad), the confidence of the republican government in him was believed to be misguided. ‘His Moroccan experience is non-existent’, declared the French consul at

Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres, before his arrival, ‘he’ll have a lot of learning to do and one wonders whether events will allow time to complete it before he finds himself facing important decisions to make.’⁷¹ Of apparently ‘impenetrable’ character and shying away from publicity, he was also ‘unfortunate’ in nominating advisors for crucial posts in the colonial administration, and resigned after a brief tenure in December 1933.⁷² Manuel Rico Avelló, Moles’ successor, completed another ‘indifferent’ term as High Commissioner (February 1934-December 1935), and was seen as a man with no particular talents, under whose time in office the Spanish colonial administration languished in the hands of incompetent collaborators.⁷³

Criticism in foreign dispatches was not limited to Spanish High Commissioners. It also applied to the republican government and its inability to design a consistent colonial policy. Notwithstanding that the situation in the Peninsula was fraught with tensions and simmering antagonism in the 1930s, arguments also used by scholars to explain (and excuse) republican blunders in Morocco, a hopelessly incoherent colonial policy, open to political influence and bias, was seen as the underlying problem in the Spanish Protectorate.⁷⁴

‘Moroccan affairs are neglected’, explained the French consul at Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres, in 1933, ‘colonial expansion is a serious task which demands continuity. It entails a sustained financial effort, a defined programme of installation. None of this exists in Spain.’⁷⁵ Superficial and casual approaches to serious colonial issues, chronic delay in dealing with pressing matters, incompetence of officials and ceaseless changes in high office were seen as inevitable outcomes of this lack of metropolitan direction.⁷⁶

Resistance and opposition on the part of colonial officers were, of course, mentioned. French observers in particular noted the growing discontent amongst officers of ‘Intervenciones’, who saw reforms introduced by the republican government —limitation of

time of service, recruitment of civilians, dispensing with military uniforms—, as undermining their role and compromising the security of the Spanish Zone.⁷⁷ Rather than seeing such concerns as ‘a confrontational and antagonistic expression of Africanist discontent and opposition to civilianization’, foreign observers were inclined to regard them as valid criticisms.⁷⁸ In fact, they tended to lend a sympathetic ear to these complaints. Eminent military figures who disapproved of the new civilian appointments, for instance Colonel Osvaldo Capaz and General Miguel Cabanellas, were believed to be ‘unjustly relegated’ to the margins. The dismissal of Colonel Capaz as the Head of the Directorate of Native Affairs, a decision probably instigated by distrustful advisors and likely to have been based on political considerations, was thoroughly lamented in French reports. His extensive knowledge of tribal traditions and his personal rapport with local caids, many of whom had been appointed by himself, made him in foreign eyes an ‘exemplary, energetic and vigilant’ figure, whose removal did not bode well for the future stability of the Spanish Zone.⁷⁹ General Cabanellas also lost López Ferrer’s favour after expressing concern at the diminishing role of military units in Morocco and voicing critical views on the new civil administration. Cabanellas pointed that civil controllers invariably lived in cities and seldom visited the countryside, being generally disinterested in the local population. ‘Not without justification’, explained the US consul general at Tangier, Maxwell Blake, ‘[General Cabanellas] averred that any measure of useful work which had been accomplished was practically exclusively due to the activities and devotion of the military administrations, and he exposed the ignorance, incompetency and general failure of civil departments.’⁸⁰

Personal rifts, however, were not the main headache for the Spanish authorities. According to the French consul at Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres, the absence of qualified civil personnel to replace military units in Native Affairs was the real quandary of the Spanish administration, a challenge which newly-appointed officials did not appear to rise to.⁸¹ The

situation was reported to be particularly serious in the countryside, where the new appointees had ‘neither the training nor, apparently, the inclination to perform their duty.’⁸² Confusion was said to spread among the tribes as pressing issues suffered delay and neglect, and relations between caids and civilian authorities deteriorated under the latter’s apparent inexperience or indifference. Acts of indiscipline previously unheard of in the kabiles were mentioned in 1933 and a general state of anxiety among tribal chiefs was widely reported in 1935.⁸³ Although some observers considered that the situation was far from alarming and only needed a stricter surveillance on the part of authorities, others worried about the effects of such lethargy in ‘anarchic’ areas such as the Djebala and the Rif, home of Abd el Krim’s rebellion in the early 1920s. Civilian controllers were making little progress in these regions, it was claimed, where the tribes had never resigned themselves to Spanish domination and still harboured aspirations of independence.⁸⁴ The conclusion reached by some officials was that ‘the installation of the republican regime, the instability of the High Commissioners and the perhaps rushed changes in personnel have created a feeling of anxiety among the natives which tends unquestionably to distance them from Spain.’⁸⁵

As the years of the civilian regime approached an end, opinions on Spanish rule acquired ominous undertones. Far from the picture of a ‘more balanced administration’, French observers claimed that Spanish colonial institutions were changing beyond recognition and not for the better.⁸⁶ Continuous reforms altered colonial structures more than ten times in five years, in some cases with no time to introduce modifications due to new, incoming reforms.⁸⁷ The extent and irrepressible nature of these changes gave reason for most foreign observers to question seriously the continuity of Spanish policy in Morocco. ‘I have seen, in three years, the Directorate of Native Affairs change hands four times’, explained the French consul at Tetouan, Jean-Claude Serres. ‘No sense of continuity exists in Spanish Morocco’, he concluded.⁸⁸ The US consul general at Tangier, Maxwell Blake,

agreed, noting that there was ‘a condition of utter chaos in the administration of the Spanish zone’, and that ‘the effrontery of the Spanish officials’ was ‘equalled only by their indifference, ignorance and incompetency.’⁸⁹ A more moderate view, put forward by the French Commander in the southern region of Taza, General Gendre, possibly encapsulated the prevailing feeling among several foreign delegates as the republican years elapsed: ‘Spain keeps not knowing what to do with her zone or in her zone’, he claimed, ‘she wavers, she hesitates, she tries, but nothing is pursued.’⁹⁰ Republican pretences of coherence and consistency in colonial policy, supported by some contemporary historians, were summarily dismissed in these reports.⁹¹

Foreign observers, however, were likely to be influenced by political bias in their assessment of the administrative reform. Some of the most intricate issues related to the new administration—the lack of qualified civilian personnel, the presence of ex-military in civilian roles and the jurisdictional conflicts within the military in Morocco—seemed to escape them.⁹² An element of chauvinism also played a part in their reports.⁹³ As a result, positive steps taken in the colonial administration during the early 1930s were often disregarded. Agricultural credits made available for settlers in 1933, for instance, which amounted to 400,000 pesetas, of which the main beneficiaries were Spanish nationals, were practically ignored. New railway and road construction projects, such as the Ceuta-Melilla road, which was finished in 1933, and a reinvigorated public works plan - including irrigation projects, civil construction plans and educational and health facilities - also failed to be noticed by British and French observers.⁹⁴ They tended to refer to other, more critical issues, such as ineffective budget reductions and the general stagnation of the Spanish Protectorate.⁹⁵ British and French delegates claimed, for instance, that budgetary cuts were not followed by a general reorientation of investment in the Spanish Zone, considered essential for a balanced financial policy. Poor understanding of the economic structure of the Spanish

Protectorate and, in particular, of the role of the Army in it, lay at the root of these ‘impractical’ reforms. Without disputing the urgency in downsizing the number of troops, the British consul general at Tangier, Sir Hugh Gurney, acknowledged that most of the economic activity in the Spanish zone was nursed by the Army, without which other resources would be imperative if economic activities were to be sustainable. ‘Economic conditions are bad at both Ceuta and Melilla’, he confirmed in 1933, ‘both places have been largely living on the military garrisons and are hit by reductions in the army.’⁹⁶ French officials shared these views. After joining High Commissioner López Ferrer on a tour around Tetouan’s countryside, the French consul at the city, Jean-Claude Serres, commented on the poverty of the inland areas, ‘which only the Army kept alive and which the withdrawals of troops are ruining slowly and surely’. ‘The zone does not have any of its own resources’, he added, ‘and the crisis gets worse by the day.’⁹⁷ Military expenditures had been by far the largest source of income for the local business community, agreed the US consul at Tangier, Donald F. Bigelow, and reductions were bound to affect dependent urban and rural communities. Lack of accompanying schemes to provide alternative sources of income for those affected, he concluded, was bound to jeopardise economic recovery.⁹⁸ Struggling iron ore exports, chronic trade imbalances with the Peninsula and rising unemployment, both among Europeans and Moroccans, compounded these woes.⁹⁹ There were, of course, exceptions to this, and some reports favourably valued progress in the Spanish Zone.¹⁰⁰ Far more frequent, however, were generalisations about half-hearted reforms and their limited impact, for which the republican government was held responsible. Some reports even questioned the support of the republican government for these initiatives. ‘The several programmes set up to revive this loss-making economy’, argued the Directorate of Political Affaires at Rabat, ‘have been met by the indifference and even the hostility of the metropolis.’¹⁰¹

IV. Sealing off the Protectorate from peninsular agitation.

A crucial issue in the scholarly debate on the origins of the Spanish Civil War refers to whether the Second Republic succeeded in sealing off the Protectorate from the simmering tensions in the Peninsula. Scholars who credit these efforts point at anti-republican colonial officers as being mainly responsible for the increasing instability in the Spanish zone. These officers found in the belief of a supposedly imminent social revolution - an alarming prospect that they did their best to propagate -, an opportunity to justify their intervention in July 1936.¹⁰² In contrast, other historians contend that the Spanish Republic was utterly incapable of containing the polarisation of Spanish politics and preventing its propagation to African shores, recreating conditions of political antagonism, economic collapse and social turbulence that allowed the military to step in.¹⁰³

As on previous occasions, reports from British and French representatives added to and detracted from both views. Parallels between the situation in the Peninsula and in Morocco, for instance, appeared at an early stage in their correspondence, featuring regularly throughout the period. The landmarks of those years: the proclamation of the Republic in 1931, the Asturian revolution of 1934 and the victory of the Popular Front in February 1936, were said to have immediate repercussions in the Protectorate. According to foreign sources, they caused anxiety in colonial military circles, invited further nationalist demands, fuelled syndicalist revolts in Ceuta and Melilla and spread general confusion among the local population. After a vigorous demonstration in the city of Tetouan in May 1931, for instance, the French minister of foreign affairs, Aristide Briand, already reported that agitators had precipitated their action in direct connection with political events in Spain.¹⁰⁴ Although martial law was promptly declared in the city, the British consul at Tetouan, Ralph Chafy, hinted that so long as things were disturbed in Spain, Spanish Morocco would be 'like an earthquake or volcano area.'¹⁰⁵

Foreign delegates were nevertheless sympathetic to the early attempts of the republican government to ensure political loyalties in a perceived hostile milieu. They soon concluded, however, that the Spanish administration in Morocco had become ‘deeply infected by the virus of the political intrigues of the Peninsula.’¹⁰⁶ As early as 1932, a number of communiqués worried about ‘the unsettled political conditions in Spain’, which were considered to be ‘spreading a spirit of indiscipline in the civil administration.’¹⁰⁷ ‘How long the entire organization will resist collapse in such conditions’, wondered the US consul general at Tangier, Maxwell Blake, ‘is a question which is still gravely preoccupying the European Powers which claim special interest in the Moroccan problem.’¹⁰⁸ Political manipulation was also said to foster ‘a spirit of bitterness and disaffection among the native elements’, providing Moroccan nationalists with new opportunities to exploit.¹⁰⁹

Three main reasons were associated with the growing influence of peninsular turmoil in the Protectorate. Firstly, republican governments were held responsible for progressively drawing the Spanish Zone of Morocco into the realm of domestic conflict, shown by the use of colonial troops in Asturias in 1934. Secondly, civil authorities in Morocco were believed to harbour little desire to confront the propaganda and violent tactics displayed by Spanish radical groups, a disposition that the government in Madrid pretended to ignore. Finally, a growing number of ‘professional agitators’ were reportedly making their way to Spanish Morocco, their activities being unmonitored due to the leniency of the colonial authorities and the apparent lack of interest of metropolitan cabinets. The overall picture was that of an unstable government progressively drawing Morocco into the domain of Spanish politics and, in parallel, losing control of the Protectorate, both administratively and socially. Possible intervention by the Army was already being suggested in 1933 together with ‘inevitable’ consequences in the French Zone.¹¹⁰

Some of these views were disputed, however. For instance, while some officials described the ‘alarming’ effects of the Revolution of Asturias, particularly related to an attempted revolutionary coup in the city of Larache in October 1934, others saw no noticeable repercussion of these events in the Spanish Zone.¹¹¹ According to the US consul general at Tangier, Maxwell Blake, any intervention of the colonial army in the Peninsula was ‘susceptible of jeopardizing the prestige of Spain in the eyes of the natives and especially detrimental to the authority of the military Commissioners entrusted with the Government of the Moroccan tribes’. However, the republican government had made use of colonial troops in the Peninsula in other occasions, with no discernible consequences in the Protectorate.¹¹² More prescient, perhaps, were the reports that interpreted the situation in Asturias in 1934 as proof of governmental helplessness in the face of a rising revolutionary tide, and an early indication of the leading role of the Army of Africa in such circumstances.¹¹³

In general, foreign representatives regarded Spanish authorities as hardly prepared for keeping order and maintaining authority under such circumstances. They depicted an administration debilitated by political intrigue and lack of expertise, where officials displayed ‘typical inaction and lethargy’ in dealing with social unrest in Morocco.¹¹⁴ As a result, military forces were often entrusted with keeping public order in the main Spanish cities, a move said to be tacitly accepted by the government (or at least conveniently ignored). A demonstration organised in Melilla in support of Asturian miners provided a dramatic example of such a state of affairs. With women and children expected to participate in the march, despite official notification that the event had not been authorised, the gathering was preceded by a stern warning on the part of the city's authorities. They made it clear to the labour leaders that military troops would be dealing with public security during the protest and had received orders to shoot, regardless of the composition of the parading groups.¹¹⁵

Violence was averted on that occasion. From then on, units of the Army of Africa were made responsible for security in the city.¹¹⁶

The activities of ‘professional agitators’ from the Peninsula were also noticed in the cities of Ceuta, Tetouan and Tangier. Rather than communist discipline, judged to be ‘incompatible with the individualistic temperament of the Spanish worker’, anarcho-syndicalist sympathies were said to predominate in the colonial labour movement, further dissipating prospects of social stability in the Spanish zone.¹¹⁷ The city of Ceuta, ‘a hotbed of syndicalist intrigue’, according to the British consul at Tetouan, George Monck-Mason, was particularly ‘affected’.¹¹⁸ Tangier was also rife with anarcho-syndicalist propaganda, which had been successful in recruiting workers (in their thousands) for both the CNT (Anarquist Trade Union) and the Anarchist Iberian Federation. As in other cities, the reaction of the Spanish authorities in Tangier was dubbed ‘hesitant and indecisive’ and ultimately ineffectual.¹¹⁹ Even if not particularly well-received by Moroccan workers, frequent acts of violence originating from these ‘dangerous ideas’ were believed to offer them a ‘deplorable example’.¹²⁰ In Tetouan, ‘foreign agitators’ had also managed to foment unrest among Moroccan workers, who adopted an eight-hour day and equality of treatment with Spaniards as their own demands.¹²¹

After the victory of the Popular Front in the elections of February 1936, foreign dispatches identified social tensions, dissolution of authority, exacerbated civil-military tensions and complicity of republican authorities with revolutionary activities as a general malaise in the Spanish Protectorate. A ‘tide of social unrest’ was reported in Ceuta, where the tobacco manufacturing plant of the city was ransacked by an ‘uncontrolled mob’, who also vandalised the offices of the local newspaper ‘El Faro’, preventing its publication.¹²² Similar incidents took place in Tetouan during a demonstration to support the amnesty proclaimed by

the new government in March 1936. Shops and establishments were damaged and attempts to burn a church were contained with difficulty.¹²³

General unrest, according to French reports, grew 'out of control' in the following months, against the backdrop of a diminishing and evaporating colonial authority. 'The Spanish Zone still suffers as a consequence of peninsular strife', explained a report by the French Ministry of War in June 1936, 'strikes have broken out in several urban centres and the authorities seem sometimes overcome by the events'.¹²⁴ Illegal demonstrations and assassination attempts were mentioned in Ceuta, Melilla and Tetouan, where perpetrators were said to act with almost total impunity.¹²⁵ Further incidents happened in Tetouan, where the decision to transfer troops to Ceuta provoked an official protest by the local Chamber of Commerce, and the troop transfer was subsequently suspended.¹²⁶ Rather than preventing further breaches of public order, some Spanish authorities were seen as actively encouraging them, as in the case of the Spanish consul general at Tangier, José Rojas. He was believed to be an active supporter of the labour movement, and was recalled after strong pressure from the French government.¹²⁷ Similarly, the delegate of the Spanish government in Melilla was accused of encouraging revolutionary acts, turning the city into a battleground.¹²⁸

Nationalist leaders, a particular preoccupation for French officials, did not fail to perceive the opportunities provided by this state of affairs. According to French sources, leading nationalist figures such as Abdelkhalek Torres made the most of the situation, alternating support for the republican government with occasional flirtations with left-wing extremists groups.¹²⁹ Further divisions between the urban and rural elements were also reported. Whereas an eerie calm reigned in the countryside, where chiefs and notables kept their distance and a sceptical eye on developments in the cities, the latter were increasingly agitated by nationalist demands.¹³⁰

The expanding influence of peninsular events in Morocco, therefore, called into question alleged republican attempts to prevent social and political radicalisation in the Spanish Protectorate, according to British and French delegates.¹³¹ When local press in Ceuta and Melilla denounced the colonial administration as being at the mercy of fluctuations of internal Spanish politics, the French Resident General, Marcel Peyrouton (March-September 1936), concurred: 'In all urban centres of the Spanish zone, the present situation is identical to that of the Peninsula.'¹³²

In such circumstances, new appointments introduced by the Popular Front, seeking to replace Africanist officers by military chiefs of proven republican credentials were unlikely to bring more stability to an already 'dissolving' colonial administration.¹³³ After renewing all Heads of the three main Moroccan Directorates, the new government brought to an end the interim period in which Rico Avelló had been acting as temporary High Commissioner.¹³⁴ General Manuel de la Plaza, his successor, was, however, swiftly ignored by the cabinet, which appointed José Canalejas – 'a personality without Moroccan expertise', according to the French Resident General, Marcel Peyrouton, - to the post of Head of the Directorate of Morocco.¹³⁵ A month later, in March 1936, de la Plaza was dismissed and Juan Moles Ormella briefly brought back to Morocco, to depart only two months later. He was finally replaced by a military, General Arturo Álvarez-Buylla, who would face the uprising of July 1936.¹³⁶

The 'purge' of perceived anti-republican officers in La Legión and Regulares (Emilio Mola, Salvador Múgica, Heliodoro Rolando de Tella, Eduardo Losas) was badly received by foreign sources, which warned of the risks that the Popular Front was taking in prizing political stances above professional ability. 'Only their lukewarm republican feelings and the real ascendancy they had over their troops', remarked a secret report of the French Residence General, 'can explain such disgraces.'¹³⁷ Far from ensuring loyalties in the Army of Africa,

the military attaché of the French Consulate at Tangier, Captain Lebrun, reported that politically motivated changes in personnel furthered divisions between monarchist and republican officers. The former were said to be closely monitored by their republican fellow officers, whilst secret societies proliferated on both sides.¹³⁸ In the event, foreign observers even anticipated the future conflict lines, not hiding where their sympathies lay in what they saw as an approaching and inevitable struggle. Commenting on rumours about an imminent evacuation of the Spanish Zone in March 1936, a report by the French Ministry of War hinted that the Army of Africa was becoming the last stand against social revolution.¹³⁹ French reports also remarked on the popularity of La Legion and Regulares among Spanish settlers and city-dwellers, anticipating their future role in such a deteriorating landscape. ‘It is understandable that the only glimmer of hope that remains in the honest population’, explained the French vice-consul at Melilla in May 1936, ‘consists of a barely whispered expectation of an uprising of the Army.’¹⁴⁰ Referring to reports pointing at a possible disbandment of La Legión and Regulares by the Frente Popular, the French Vice-Consul at Melilla, Henri Ribes, for whom such units constituted ‘a real praetorian guard in the hands of forceful commanders’, closed his report with a sobering prediction. ‘It is beyond doubt that, if that happened’, he claimed, ‘the 8,000 or so adventurers (almost all Spaniards) so thrown in the streets would be immediately regrouped by their commanders and could intervene not only in the places of sovereignty but also in the Peninsula.’¹⁴¹

It would have been difficult for foreign observers to ignore such circumstances in their interpretation of the military uprising of July 1936. Their reports anticipated a view heavily criticised in recent scholarship, which depicted the uprising of July 1936 as an almost inevitable outcome of republican policies, which created both in Morocco (and in the Peninsula) a situation verging on social revolution.¹⁴² ‘It constitutes’, explained a Memorandum by the French Residence General in Morocco, ‘the reaction of the petit and

grand bourgeoisie and of the army against social disarray, the strikes, the burnings, the abuses of power, the arbitrary arrests and in general all offences against individuals committed in the name of freedom since the elections of February.¹⁴³ In the early stages, the revolt was seen as having ‘a very assured republican character’, deduced from the fact that most participating figures were well-known republicans (Emilio Mola, Gonzalo Queipo de Llano, Miguel Cabanellas). The fascist undertones of the rebellion, however, and the fact that the military acted against a legitimate, popularly elected government were downplayed in official correspondence.¹⁴⁴

Foreign observers also tended to explain the reaction of the indigenous population to the coup as the result of these misguided colonial policies. Their predominant view was that the Popular Front had ultimately ignored the longing for peace, order and authority that was prevalent in the local communities.¹⁴⁵ Notwithstanding the influence of untimely and persistent droughts and poor crops in 1936, the ‘unwise’ measures taken by the Popular Front and the general economic stagnation of the Spanish Protectorate made the responsibility of the Second Republic in this situation more obvious to foreign eyes.¹⁴⁶

The intense recruitment effort undertaken by rebel officers after the coup found in these circumstances ‘enough reasons to succeed’, according to the French Residence in Rabat. Apart from occasional resistance to serving under the Spanish flag in certain areas (such as in Boccoya, Beni Ittefr or Djeballa), the strict control imposed by the units of La Legión and Regulares and the regular pay provided to those who joined the insurrection proved to be both too intimidating and tempting, particularly in the countryside.¹⁴⁷ Rebel propaganda was also considered to be ‘methodical and intensive’ from the beginning, and included ‘effective’ slogans based on adventure, the mystique of a ‘Reconquista’ of Spain and struggle against atheist communism. It also promised incentives, salaries and booty for those who joined the ranks of the rebels and incarceration in concentration camps for those

who did not.¹⁴⁸ ‘This looks as if every available man were going to be sent from Morocco to the front’, explained the British consul at Tetouan, George Monck-Mason. ‘There is no doubt that the Moors in the Zone are in favour of the revolt.’¹⁴⁹

It appears that foreign observers generally aligned with the view that the successful recruitment of native Moroccans into rebel units was primarily a result of misguided and failed republican colonial policies, rather than an inevitable outcome of military conscription enforced by the rebels or other factors over which the Republic had little or no control.¹⁵⁰ Other interesting insights into the social composition of the Spanish Protectorate added further explanations. Noticing that only Jewish communities in Tangier, Ceuta and Melilla took sides against the insurgent movement from the outset, the US consul general at Tangier, Maxwell Blake, commented that ‘such espousal on their part’ was sufficient in itself ‘to throw the Moslem community on the other side of the scale’. ‘The latter in all parts of Morocco appear entirely to favour General Franco’ he concluded, ‘as is conversely the case with the Jews.’¹⁵¹

V. Conclusion.

Contemporary scholarship has become increasingly aware of the influence that republican colonial policies had on the general situation in Spanish Morocco in the early 1930s, which served as background to the military uprising of July 1936. Historians have seldom incorporated, however, foreign sources and appraisals into this discussion. With exceptions related to foreign policy and the reaction of British and French governments to the events of July 1936, foreign impressions and estimations have been frequently neglected. It is the main contention of this article that British and French official representatives in Morocco held views and opinions that may enrich the ongoing debate on republican projects in Spanish Morocco and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War.

Three main points of interest have been highlighted in this article. Firstly, the profound repercussions and lasting implications that republican native policies had in foreign opinion. Generally portrayed in contemporary scholarship as feeble and irrelevant displays of sympathy towards Moroccan nationalists, British and French delegates underlined, however, how these conciliatory attempts created intense frictions among colonial partners and presented an overall threat to the edifice of European imperialism in Morocco. Lingering suspicions about the colonial commitment of the Second Republic were subsequently voiced, and foreign delegates found reason to believe that the Republic was not entirely dependable and could finally opt for abandoning the Protectorate. Such apprehensions, seen as promising signs by Moroccan nationalists, significantly damaged the international credibility of the Second Republic. Ultimately, lenient and friendly attitudes towards Moroccan nationalists failed to gain their support in the events of July 1936.

Secondly, the difficulties and limited success which republican colonial projects met with in Morocco were seen by foreign representatives not so much as a result of domestic turbulence, scarce resources or Africanist resistance to republican projects – as frequently mentioned by historians - but mainly as undisputable evidence of a hopeless lack of colonial vision. Particularly noted in their dispatches was the contradictory, ill-conceived and rushed nature of changing colonial directives, which led British and French observers to disregard any pretence of continuity or consistency in republican colonial policies.

In line with these misgivings, and particularly since the inception of the Popular Front, government foreign representatives tended to portray the situation in Morocco as quickly running out of control and verging on anarchy, against the backdrop of a dissolving authority. These views were instrumental in providing an early interpretation of the uprising of July 1936 as a vigorous reaction of the Army of Africa against the threat of social revolution and in defence of law, order and stability. In adhering to these views, they were

not only overlooking and denying the legitimacy of the Popular Front as rightful government established in February 1936. They were also anticipating the attitudes of British and French governments towards the insurrection.

With regards to native Moroccans' motivations to join the rebellion of 1936, economic pressures were also frequently cited by foreign officials. Most reports tended to emphasize that the situation in Morocco had deteriorated significantly during the republican years and that a healthy recruitment to the rebels' side was a predictable outcome of such state of affairs. The lack of development in Morocco and the poor economic conditions prevalent in the area in July 1936 were not seen in foreign eyes as a result of untimely circumstances – persistent droughts, poor crops - but as a consequence of misguided republican colonial policies.

Notes

¹ See Abel Paz, *La Cuestión de Marruecos y la República Española* (Madrid: Fundación de Estudios Libertarios Anselmo Lorenzo, 2000); Sebastian Balfour, *Deadly Embrace. Morocco and the Road to the Spanish Civil War (1909-1939)* (Oxford, OUP, 2002); José Antonio González Alcantud (ed), *Marroquíes en la guerra civil española: campos equívocos* (Barcelona, Anthropos, 2003); José Luis Neila, *La IIa República española y el Mediterráneo: España ante el desarme y la seguridad colectiva* (Madrid, Dilema, 2006); **Juan Pan-Montojo (coord.)** *El sueño republicano de Manuel Rico Avelló (1886-1936)* (Madrid, Biblioteca Nueva, 2011); Mourad Zarrouk, *Clemente Cerdeira: Intérprete, diplomático y espía al servicio de la Segunda República* (Madrid, Reus, 2017).

² The debates in María Rosa de Madariaga, ‘The Intervention of Moroccan Troops in the Spanish Civil War: A Reconsideration’, *European History Quarterly*, xxii (1992), 67 – 97; Fernando Rodríguez Mediano and Helena de Felipe (eds.), *El protectorado español en Marruecos: gestión colonial e identidades* (Madrid, CSIC, 2002), 7-12; Balfour, ‘Deadly Embrace’, 274; and A. Mechbal, ‘Los Moros de la Guerra Civil española: entre memoria e historia’, *Amnis*, ii (2011), retrieved from www.amnis.revues.org/1487. Consulted on 08/07/2017.

³ S. E. Fleming, ‘Spanish Morocco and the Second Republic: Consistency in colonial policy?’, *Mediterranean Historical Review*, xiii (1998), 80-98; Balfour, ‘Deadly’, 244-5; María Rosa de Madariaga, ‘La guerra colonial llevada a España: las tropas marroquíes en el ejército franquista’, in González Alcantud (ed.), *Marroquíes*, 58-94.

⁴ In the first instance, S. E. Fleming, ‘Spanish Morocco’, 80-98; in the second, Víctor Morales Lezcano, ‘El Protectorado español bajo la Segunda República (las Reformas Administrativas)’, in Instituto Hispano-Árabe de Cultura, *Actas de las Jornadas de Cultura Árabe e Islámica*, (Madrid, IHAC, 1981), 457-74 and M. R. de Madariaga, ‘La II República en el Protectorado: reformas y contrarreformas administrativas y burocráticas’, *Awraq*, v-vi (2012), 97-115, 113-4.

⁵ Balfour, 'Deadly', 244; José Luis Villanova Valero, *Los interventores: la piedra angular del protectorado español en Marruecos* (Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2006), 51-5.

⁶ Balfour, 'Deadly', 272-3; María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los Moros que trajo Franco* (Barcelona, Martínez Roca, 2002), 113 and ff.; Abdelmajid Benjelloun, 'La causa de la participación de marroquíes en la guerra civil española (1936-1939)', en González Alcantud (ed.), *Marroquíes*, 42-57; A. Mechbal, 'Los Moros'; Ali Al Tuma, *Guns, Culture and Moors: Racial Perceptions, Cultural Impact and the Moroccan Participation in the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939)* (Abingdon, Routledge, 2018).

⁷ See Paloma Rupérez, 'Las fuentes documentales del Protectorado español de Marruecos: los pilares de la memoria' in Manuel Aragón Reyes (dir.), *El Protectorado español en Marruecos: la historia trascendida* (Bilbao, Iberdrola, 2013), vol. II, 175-98. Examples of use of foreign archives in J. L. Neila Hernández, *La IIa República*, and Enrique Moradiellos, *La perfidia de Albión: el gobierno británico y la guerra civil española* (Madrid, SXXI, 1996), 98-125.

⁸ As pointed by Eloy Martín Corrales, 'Marruecos y los marroquíes en la propaganda oficial del Protectorado, 1912-1956' in Helena de Felipe (ed.) *Imágenes coloniales de Marruecos en España*, (Madrid, Casa de Velázquez, 2007), 83-107.

⁹ Readers will note that references to the territory of Ifni, in Southern Morocco, are absent from these pages. Certainly, Ifni was far from unconnected to the major developments in the protectorate during the republican period. However, in view of the limited attention that foreign sources devoted to this region, I have deemed it advisable not to include it in this article. For more information see Francisco Quintana Navarro, 'La ocupación de Ifni (1934): anotaciones a un capítulo de la política africanista de la 2ª. República', en Víctor Morales Lezcano (ed.), *II Aula Canarias y el Noroeste de Africa*, (Las Palmas, Edic, del Cabildo de Gran Canaria, 1986), 97-124.

¹⁰ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 85; Eloy Martín Corrales, 'Represión contra cristianos, moros y judíos en la Guerra civil en el Protectorado español de Marruecos, Ceuta y Melilla', en Rodríguez Mediano y de Felipe, 'El

protectorado', 111-138, 124; Balfour, 'Deadly', 245 and 273; and María Rosa de Madariaga, *Los Moros que trajo Franco* (Barcelona, Martínez Roca, 2002), 113.

¹¹ Gurney to Sir John Simon, secretary of state, 4 Feb. 1932, [Kew, The National Archives, Public Record Office], F[oreign] O[ffice] R[ecords], 371/16483. See also the report by the US Consul General in Tangier, Maxwell Blake, to Henry L. Stimson, secretary of state, 30 Jun. 1932 [Washington, United States National Archives, Record Group 59], S[tate] D[epartment] D[ecimal] F[ile], 881.00/1539, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989. Maxwell Blake had acted as chargé d'affaires at the US Legation in Tangier before being appointed Consul General (1925-40).

¹² Monck-Mason to Simon, 25 May 1934, FO 371/18557. George Monck-Mason was Consul in Tetouan from 1933 to 1938. It was later appointed consul to Mosul (Iraq), where he was murdered during riots in the city in 1939.

¹³ Bulletin des Reinseignements des Questions Musulmanes (BRQM). Report, 4 Feb. 1933. [Paris. France. Centre d'Accueil et de Recherche des Archives Nationales], CARAN, S[ecrétariat G[énéral] du Gouvernement], A[frique du N[ord], M[inistère de la] G[uerre]É[tat] M[ajor de l']A[rmée]/S[ection d']O[utre]-M[er], F/60/769/2.

¹⁴ Monck-Mason to Simon, 24 Nov. 1933, FO 413/84.

¹⁵ Blanc to Édouard Herriot, minister of foreign affairs, 13 Sep. 1932, Maroc, 1917-1940, leg. 205, [Paris, France, Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères], ADMAE, M[aroc, 1917-1940], 205.

¹⁶ Gurney to Simon, 4 Feb. 1932, FO 371/16483.

¹⁷ Bigelow to Stimson, 11 Jan. 1933, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1549, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989. The tangible advantages brought by this more conciliatory attitude were not lost in the Spanish Foreign Office, in the wider context of the long-term disputes between France and Spain in North Africa. See María Ángeles Egido León

(ed.), *La concepción de la política exterior española durante la Segunda República*, (Madrid, UNED, 1987), 159-163.

¹⁸ Monck-Mason to Simon, 24 Nov. 1933, FO 413/84.

¹⁹ Saint to Aristide Briand, minister of foreign affairs, 12 May 1931, [Vincennes, France, Service Historique de l'Armée de Terre], SHAT, M[orocco], 3H263. His successor, Henri Ponsot, shared the same misgivings (Ponsot to Laval, 3 Jan 1935, SHAT, M., 3H260. Such reports question the assertion of Morales Lezcano that the French Resident General initially became more sympathetic towards the nationalists during this period ('Orígenes contemporáneos del nacionalismo marroquí', *Awraq*, ii (1979), 123-35). This is further questioned by Gilles Lafuente, *La politique berbère de la France et le nationalisme marocain* (Paris, L'Harmattan, 1999), 141-268.

²⁰ Sarrault to Louis Barthou, minister of foreign affairs, 30 Sep. 1934, SHAT, M., 3H260.

²¹ Herbette to Pierre Laval, minister of foreign affairs, 29 Apr. 1935, SHAT, M., 3H260.

²² Direction des Affaires Indigènes (DAI), Report, 16-30 Sep. 1934, SHAT, M., 3H1413.

²³ Edmonds to Simon, 15 May 1933, FO 371/17397. On the distinction between Berbers and Arabs in the Spanish Protectorate, see Geoffrey Jensen, 'The Peculiarities of 'Spanish Morocco': Imperial Ideology and Economic Development', *Mediterranean Historical Review*, xx (2005), 81-102.

²⁴ BRQM. Report, January 1936. CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

²⁵ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

²⁶ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 81-4; and Ramón Salas Larrazábal, *El Protectorado de España en Marruecos* (Madrid, Mapfre, 1992), 181-9, in the first case, and Balfour, 'Deadly', 244-5 and Martín Corrales, 'Represión', 111-38.

²⁷ BRQ. Report, 7 Apr. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

²⁸ See Madariaga, 'Los moros', 113 and Balfour, 'Deadly', 245. Some authors claim that the Second Republic betrayed Moroccan nationalists. See Ignacio Alcaraz Cánovas, 'El Protectorado de España en Marruecos y el Frente Popular', *Cuadernos republicanos*, lx (2006), 51-64.

²⁹ BRQM. Report, 7 Apr. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

³⁰ Herbette to Laval, 25 Nov. 1935, CARAN, SG, AN, F/60/707.

³¹ Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, ADMAE, M., 205.

³² BRQM. Report, 10 Jan. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

³³ BRQM. Reports 14 Oct. and 13 Dec. 1933 and 13 Apr. 1934, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2. Favourable views in Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 83-91; Balfour, 243-4; Geoffrey Jensen, 'Rico Avelló en Marruecos', in **Juan Pan-Montojo (coord.)**, *El sueño*, 121-50; Maria Rosa de Madariaga, *Marruecos, ese gran desconocido: breve historia del protectorado español* (Madrid, Alianza Editorial, 2013), 187; and Irene González, *Spanish Education in Morocco, 1912–1956. Cultural Interactions in a Colonial Context*, (Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2015), 127-32.

³⁴ Comments on both in BRQM. Report, 10 Oct. 1935, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

³⁵ BRQM. Report, 15 Oct. 1935, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2. Such views question more positive assessments by G. Jensen, 'Rico Avelló', 132-9, who highlights his conciliatory attitudes towards young Moroccan nationalists, and Irene González, 'Spanish Education', 127-32, who remarks his interest in education.

³⁶ In marked contrast with views such as those of Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 81-4.

³⁷ BRQM. Report, Feb. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

³⁸ Cottrelle to Direction des Affaires Indigènes, 15 Sep. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139.

³⁹ Italian vice-consul at Tetouan, Mr Bivio Sbrana, to Mussolini, 2 Nov. 1933, [Rome. Italy, Ministero degli Affari Esteri] MAE, A[ffari] P[olitici, 1931-1945], M[arocco], busta 4.

⁴⁰ Monck-Mason to Simon, 3 Jul. 1933, FO 371/17397.

⁴¹ Serres to Saint, 1 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264.

⁴² Bigelow to Stimson, 11 Jan. 1933, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1549, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

⁴³ Memo by Charles N. Stirling, African Department, 28 Dec. 1933, FO, 371/2412.

⁴⁴ BRQM. Report, 9 May 1934, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁴⁵ Monck-Mason to Simon, 24 Sep. 1933, FO 371/17402.

⁴⁶ Ponsot to Laval, 3 Jan. 1935, SHAT, M., 3H260.

⁴⁷ Monck-Mason to Simon, 3 Jul. 1933, FO 371/17397.

⁴⁸ G. Jensen, 'Toward the "Moral Conquest" of Morocco: Hispano-Arabic Education in Early Twentieth-Century North Africa', *European History Quarterly*, xxxi (2001), 206.

⁴⁹ Geoffrey Jensen, 'The Peculiarities', 89-91; Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste, *La 'hermandad' hispano-marroquí. Política y religión bajo el protectorado español en Marruecos (1912- 1956)* (Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2003), and Manuela Marín, *Testigos coloniales: españoles en Marruecos [1860-1956]* (Barcelona, Bellaterra, 2015), 25-55.

⁵⁰ The evidence is overwhelming here: Edmonds, to Simon, 15 and 30 May 1933, FO 371/17401, and Mr King, British vice-consul at Fez, to Simon, 24 May 1933, FO 371/17401.

⁵¹ BRQM. Report, Apr. 1935, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

⁵² BRQM. Report, Jul. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

⁵³ Herbette, to Briand, 5 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139. The crucial tenet of white supremacy for European colonial powers is further explored in Kenneth Weisbrode, 'International Administration Between the Wars: A Reappraisal', *Diplomacy & Statecraft* xx, (2009): 30-49.

⁵⁴ BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1. Such reports question contemporary views by J. L. Neila Hernández, 'Las responsabilidades internacionales de la II República en Marruecos: El problema del abandonismo', *Estudios Africanos*, viii-ix (1990), 47-71; Madariaga, 'El Protectorado', 176; Balfour, 'Deadly', 244-5 and Neila, 'La IIa República', 197.

⁵⁵ BRQM. Report, 4 Feb. and 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁵⁶ BRQM. Report, 14 Aug. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1. The same conclusion in Jean Wolf, *Les secrets du Maroc espagnol: l'épopée d'Abd-el-Khaleq Torrès* (Casablanca, Eddif, 1994), 200-206 ; and in Balfour, 244-5.

⁵⁷ See Morales Lezcano, 'El Protectorado'; Balfour, 243-4; Madariaga, 'La II República', 106; Stanley G. Payne, "Spanish Praetorianism revisited," in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *A Restless Mind: Essays in Honor of Amos Perlmutter* (Abingdon, Routledge, 2013), 227-230.

⁵⁸ See Morales Lezcano, 'El Protectorado', 463; Ramón Salas Larrazábal, *El Protectorado de España en Marruecos* (Madrid, Mapfre, 1992), 184; Fleming 'Spanish Morocco', 83; M. R. de Madariaga, 'La II República', 113-4.

⁵⁹ Blake to Stimson, 30 June 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1539, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

⁶⁰ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁶¹ Blake to Stimson, 30 Jun. 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1539, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989. Also BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁶² Charles Corbin, French ambassador at Madrid, to Briand, 9 Jun. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139. An appraisal of the crucial role of these units in Villanova, 'Los interventores', 20-35.

⁶³ Serres to Saint, 26 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139.

⁶⁴ Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264.

⁶⁵ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁶⁶ The Army of Africa was reduced by 12,000 soldiers. Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264. See Balfour, 'Deadly', 243.

⁶⁷ Serres to Saint, 26 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139.

⁶⁸ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2

⁶⁹ Serres to Saint, 26 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139. A 'veteran diplomat' (Madariaga, 'La II República', 98); 'a seasoned colonial bureaucrat' (Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 83) and a committed republican with a long history in favour of civilian rule in Morocco (José Luis Villanova, 'La pugna entre militares y civiles por el control de la actividad interventora en el protectorado español en Marruecos (1912-1956)', *Hispania*, lxxv (2005): 683-715, 694-695), among recent appraisals.

⁷⁰ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 86. See Serres to Paul-Boncour, French minister of foreign affairs, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264.

⁷¹ Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264.

⁷² BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁷³ BRQM. Report, February 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1. This appraisal questions Jensen's views in 'Rico Avelló', 122-28 and also positive opinions in Irene González, *Spanish Education*, 127-32. Other authors, however, coincide in considering Rico Avelló as 'a decorative figure'. (Madariaga, *Marruecos*, 209).

⁷⁴ Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264. Unlike the views of Salas, 'El Protectorado', 181-189; and Madariaga, 'La II República', 107.

⁷⁵ Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁷⁸ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 87. Similar views in Villanova, 'La pugna', 711.

⁷⁹ Serres to Saint, 26 Nov. 26, 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139 and Herbette to Briand, 6 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139).

⁸⁰ Blake to Stimson, 12 Jan. 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1523, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989. Such views are considered 'disproportionate' by Villanova, 'La pugna', 707.

⁸¹ Serres to Saint, 26 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Direction des Affaires Indigènes (DAI), Fez, Report, Jun. 1931 and Jul. 1932, SHAT, M., 3H1438.

⁸⁴ Both views in BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁸⁵ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

⁸⁶ Claims of a more balanced administration in Balfour, 'Deadly', 240.

⁸⁷ Serres to Saint, 28 Jan. 1933, SHAT, M., 3H264.

⁸⁸ Ibid.

⁸⁹ Blake to Cordell Hull, secretary of state, 1 Jun. 1934, SD, USNA, SDDF 881.00/29, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

⁹⁰ Gendre to Saint, Rapports politiques mensuels des régions, 1933, [Rabat, Morocco, Archives du Protectorat Français], APF, Bibliothèque General (BG), box B9.

⁹¹ Particularly in Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 80-98 and Jensen, 'Rico Avelló', 139-48.

⁹² See Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 91-4; José Luis Villanova, 'La pugna', 683-715; Josep Lluís Mateo Dieste, 'El interventor y el Caíd. La política colonial española frente a la justicia marroquí durante el protectorado de Marruecos', *Hispania*, lxxvii (2007): 643-670, and Jensen, 'Rico Avelló', 121-50.

⁹³ Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 87.

⁹⁴ Salas, 'El Protectorado', 199; Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 90-92.

⁹⁵ Blake to Stimson, 30 Jun. 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1523, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

⁹⁶ Gurney to Simon, 23 Jan. 1933, FO 371/17398.

⁹⁷ Serres to Saint, 6 Aug. and 26 Nov. 1931, SHAT, M., 3H139.

⁹⁸ Bigelow to Stimson, 11 Jan. 1933, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1549, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

⁹⁹ Direction des Affaires Politiques, DAP, Résidence Général de la République Française au Maroc, secret report, Jan.-Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H1421.

¹⁰⁰ BRQM. Report, 14 Oct. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

¹⁰¹ DAP, secret report, Jan.-Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H1421.

¹⁰² Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 96; Balfour, 'Deadly', 246; Madariaga, 'Los Moros', 120 and Dieste, 'El interventor', 646-7.

¹⁰³ Morales Lezcano, 'El Protectorado', 457-474 and Stanley G. Payne, *Spain's First Democracy: The Second Republic, 1931-1936* (Madison, WI, UWP, 1993), 371-386.

¹⁰⁴ Briand to André Maginot, French minister of war, 7 May 1931, SHAT, M., 3H122. This point has been sufficiently noted by Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 81-2; Balfour, 'Deadly', 237-238 and Madariaga, 'Marruecos', 171-7.

¹⁰⁵ Chafy to Arthur Henderson, secretary of state, 14 May 1931, FO 371/15745.

¹⁰⁶ Blake to Stimson, 4 May 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1539, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

¹⁰⁷ Colonel Louis Fabre, French Commander of the Ouezzan region, to Saint, 4 Oct. 1932, SHAT, M., 3H264.

¹⁰⁸ Blake to Stimson, 4 May 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1539, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989.

¹⁰⁹ BRQM. Report, 4 Feb. 1933, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

¹¹⁰ Paul-Boncour to Herbette, 23 Jan. 1933, ADMAE, M., 83.

¹¹¹ In the first group, Ribes, to Ponsot, 14 Mar. 1935, SHAT, M., 3H249; in the second, BRQM. Report, 8 Nov. 1934, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/2.

¹¹² Blake to Stimson, 27 Aug. 1932, USNA, SDDF 881.00/1544, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989. See also Balfour, 'Deadly', 251.

¹¹³ General André Corap, Commandant Supérieur des Troupes du Maroc, to Ponsot, 27 Sept. 1935, SHAT, M., 3H261. See also Balfour, 'Deadly', 256.

¹¹⁴ DAI report, 6-31 Oct. 1934, SHAT, M., 3H1413.

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

¹¹⁶ DAI report, 1-15 Nov. 1934, SHAT, M., 3H1413.

¹¹⁷ Ribes to Ponsot, 14 Mar. 1935, SHAT, M. 3H249. The intervention of 'professional agitators' in Morocco is played down by Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 81-2; Balfour, 'Deadly', 237-238 and Madariaga, 'Marruecos', 171-7.

¹¹⁸ Monck-Mason to Simon, Jul. 27, 1934, FO 371/18557, NA.

¹¹⁹ Xavier De Laforcade, French plenipotentiary minister at Tangier, to Ponsot, 27 Mar. 1935, SHAT., M., 3H249.

¹²⁰ Monck-Mason to Simon, 16 Feb. 1934, FO 371/18557.

¹²¹ Briand to Maginot, 7 May 1931, SHAT, M., 3H122. For workers' organisation in the protectorate, see Martín Corrales, 'Represión', 11-38.

¹²² BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹²³ BRQM. Report, Apr. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹²⁴ BRQM. Report, 19 Jun. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹²⁵ DAI report, 29 May 1936, SHAT, M., 3H1421. Also BRQM. Reports, 12 May and 17 Jul. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹²⁶ DAP, secret report, Jan.-Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H1421 and BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹²⁷ BRQM. Report, 12 May and 17 Jul. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1. Also Gurney to Anthony Eden, secretary of state, 18 May 1936, FO 371/20497.

¹²⁸ Ribes to Ponsot, 28 May 1935, SHAT, M., 3H264.

¹²⁹ BRQM. Report, 19 Jun and 4 Aug. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1. See also Wolf, 'Les secrets', 200-5.

¹³⁰ BRQM. Report, 17 Jul. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹³¹ BRQM. Report, 12 May 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹³² Peyrouton to Yvon Delbos, French minister of war, report Jan.-Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H1421. Marcel Peyrouton had been French Resident General in Tunisia (1933-36). He was only briefly French Resident general in Morocco (March-Sept 1936).

¹³³ BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Peyrouton to Delbos, report Jan.-Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H1421.

¹³⁶ According to French reports, all he knew about Morocco he had learnt it in Madrid. BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹³⁷ DAP, RG, secret report, January-July 1936, 3H1421, SHAT.

¹³⁸ Lebrun to Peyrouton, 29 Apr. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H264, SHAT.

¹³⁹ BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹⁴⁰ Ribes to Peyrouton, 28 May 1936, SHAT, M. 3H264.

¹⁴¹ Ibid. See Balfour, 'Deadly', 266.

¹⁴² Criticism in Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 94 and Corrales, 'Represión', 126.

¹⁴³ DAP, RG, report, 16 to 31 Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H158.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid. See Moradiellos, 'La perfidia', 44.

¹⁴⁵ DAP, RG, report, 16 to 31 Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H158.

¹⁴⁶ DAP, RG, secret report, January-July 1936, 3H1421, SHAT and BRQM. Report, Mar. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1.

¹⁴⁷ DAP, RG, report, 16 to 31 Jul. 1936, SHAT, M., 3H158.

¹⁴⁸ BRQM. Report, 14 Aug. 1936, CARAN, SG, AN, MG/EMA/SOM, F/60/769/1 and DAP, RG, secret report, January-July 1936, 3H1421, SHAT

¹⁴⁹ Monck-Mason to Eden, 3, 11 and 15 Aug. 1936, [Kew, The National Archives, Public Record Office], C[abinet] O[ffice Records], CO 91/500/2.

¹⁵⁰ The role of officers of Interventions in ensuring the support of local caids for the revolt (Dieste, 'El interventor', 646-7) or the favourable attitude of the Sultan representatives towards the rebels (Mechbal, 'Los Moros').

¹⁵¹ Blake to Hull, 21 Aug. 1936, USNA, SDDF 881.00/37, Morocco 1930-39, box 6989. The initial goodwill of the Spanish Second Republic towards the Jews in Morocco has been noted by some historians, among them Fleming, 'Spanish Morocco', 90 and Isabelle Rohr, *The Spanish Right and the Jews, 1898-1945* (Eastbourne, Sussex Academic Press, 2008), 39-49. The hostile reaction of the Jewish community to the uprising has also been seen as a consequence of the anti-Semitic discourse of the Nationalists (Isabelle Rohr, 'The Spanish Right', 66-73 and Martín Corrales, 'Represión', 120-128).