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Ergonomic Challenges for Digitization: Learning from Analog Mission Planning Processes

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Abstract

This article aims to consider the conventional, analog, mission planning process with the objective of identifying the decision making constraints and challenges for digitization. Prototypes of digital mission planning systems are beginning to be devised and demonstrated, but there has been concern expressed over the design of such systems which fail to understand and incorporate the human aspects of socio-technical systems design. Previous research has identified many of the potential pitfalls of failing to take Human Factors considerations into account as well as the multiplicity of constraints acting on the planners and planning process. An analysis of mission planning in a Battle Group is presented, based on an observational study by the authors. This study illustrates the efficiency of an analog process which has evolved over many generations to form the Combat Estimate, a process that is mirrored by forces throughout the world. The challenges for digitization include ensuring that the mission planning process remains easy and involving, preserving the public nature of the products, encouraging the collaboration and cooperation of the planners, and maintaining the flexibility, adaptability and speed of the analog planning process. It is argued that digitization should not become an additional constraint on mission planning.
Introduction to mission planning

Mission failure is often thought to be the result of poor mission planning (Levchuk et al. 2002), which places considerable demands on the planners and the planning process. This observation is further confounded by the two general principles of warfare. The first principle is that of the “fog of war” (i.e., the many uncertainties about the true nature of the environment, Clausewitz 1832) and second the principle that “no battle plan survives contact with the enemy” (i.e., no matter how thorough the planning is, the enemy is unlikely to be compliant and may act in unpredictable ways, von Moltke n.d.). These three factors (i.e., the effects of uncertainty, the enemy, and failure on mission planning) require the planning process to be robust, auditable, and flexible. Mission planning has to be a continuous, iterative and adaptable process, optimizing mission goals, resources, and constraints (Levchuck 2002). Roth et al. (2006) argue that the defining characteristic of command and control is the continual adaptation to a changing environment. Constant change in the goals, priorities, scale of operations, information sources, and systems being used means that the planning systems need to be extremely adaptable to cope with these changes. According to Klein and Miller (1999) there are many constraints acting on mission planning, including scarcity of resources, time pressure, uncertainty of information, availability of expertise, and the structure of the tasks to be undertaken. Mission planning requires knowledge of the domain, objects in the domain and their relationships as well as the constraints acting on the domain, the objects and their relations (Kieweit et al. 2005). They also note that the planning cycles can range from a couple of hours to a few days depending upon the complexity of the situation and the time available. Given all of the constraints acting on the planning process and the need for the plan to be continually revised and modified in light of the enemy actions and changing situation, Klein and Miller (1999) argue that “simpler plans might allow better implementation and easier modification”
This point is reinforced by Riley et al. (2006) who assert that “plans need to be simple, modifiable, flexible, and developed so that they are quickly and easily understood” (Ibid., 1143).

Mission planning is an essential and integral part of battle management. Although there are some differences within and between the armed services (and the coalition forces) in the way they go about mission planning, there are also some generally accepted aspects that all plans need to assess. These invariants include: enemy strength, activity and assumed intentions, the goals of the mission, analysis of the constraints in the environment, the intent of the commander, developing courses of action, choosing a course of action, identifying resource requirements, synchronizing the assets and actions, and identifying control measures. A summary of the planning process for the United States Army may be found in Riley et al. (2006) and the Canadian Army may be found in Prefontaine (2002). Their description has much in common with land-based planning in the British Army, which is described in The Combat Estimate booklet (UK MoD 2007).

**Observation of Mission Planning in a Battle Group**

The mission planning process has been observed by the authors at the Land Warfare Centre at Warminster in the United Kingdom and on training exercises in Germany. The observations at Warminster have been both as participant-observers and as normal observers. The processes observed describe UK doctrine only, although there are some parallels with planning doctrine in other nations. In the case study described in this article, the authors undertook direct observations of the planning processes, sitting in the planning cell within the Battle Group Head Quarters while recording the actions of staff officers and photographing the products that they produced. When time permitted they asked questions of clarification directly to the staff officers. All of the authors were Human Factors researchers whom were well versed in Human Factors methods (Stanton et al.
The findings from the study, as presented in this article, were presented back to the staff officers at the end of the exercises to check that the interpretations were valid. Therefore, this research may be considered to be an exploratory study of the traditional (non-digital) planning processes.

This article is based upon single case study research of an exercise in Germany, an approach used previously by researchers exploring the military planning process (Klein and Miller 1999; Riley et al. 2006; Roth et al. 2006). This is a recognized approach within Human Factors with numerous researchers developing methodologies describing the process of developing theory from case study research. Glaser and Strauss outline Grounded Theory (1967), a method based around constant comparison of data and theory, highlighting the emergence of theoretical categories solely from evidence. Additionally, researchers such as Eisenhardt (1989) have developed processes to validate the development of theory from case study research as well as arguing the benefits of such a research stance. Eisenhardt (1989) argues that such theory building is more likely to develop novel theory; more likely to develop testable theory with readily measurable constructs; and more likely to develop empirically valid theory as it is so intimately tied to evidence.

This section describes the observed activities in the planning process following a Warning Order received from Brigade. For the purpose of this analysis, only the conventional materials (whiteboards, maps, overlays, paper, flip charts and staff officers’ notebooks) were examined. As Figure 1 shows, the planning is undertaken in a public environment where various people contribute and all can view the products. This public nature of the products is particularly useful at the briefings, which encourages collaboration and cooperation. It also helps to focus the planners’ minds on the important issues and the command intent.
The following vignette describes how a Battle Group Headquarters was observed to conduct itself in the planning process. While other Battle Group Headquarters might vary, the basic themes are likely to be similar in the processes they follow and products they produce.

**Warning Order from Brigade arrived**

The Warning Order (WO) arrived and was handed to the Chief of Staff (CoS) who read the whole document first, highlighting relevant material for himself and the Company level.
Chief of Staff creates Company Warning Order

The WO was too detailed for Company level, so some editing by CoS was necessary, as well as the inclusion of some additional material to clarify the anticipated task requirements.

Send Warning Order to Companies

The modified and edited WO was then sent to the companies below the Battle Group, so that they would have advanced notice of the intention of the orders when they arrived. This gives them an opportunity to prepare in advance of the actual orders.

Create planning timeline

The CoS created a planning timeline for the production of a plan to defeat an assault team that had parachuted into their area. There were 2 hours available to construct the plan (from 1300 to 1500), which allotted approximately 17 minutes per question (of the Combat Estimate’s 7 questions) as shown in Appendix Figure 1. The planning timeline was drawn on a flip chart. The Combat Estimate is a planning process that has been developed over decades and is described in more detail in The Combat Estimate book issued by the Command and Staff Trainer organization at the Land Warfare Centre in Warminster, U K (2007). The Combat Estimate has 7 main questions to guide planners through the process, namely:

Q 1. What is the enemy doing and why?

Q 2. What have been I told to do and why?

Q 3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop my plan?
Q 4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

Q 5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

Q 6. Where and when do each of the actions take place in relation to each other?

Q 7. What control measures do I need to impose?

The activities that were observed in answering each of these questions are presented.

Q 1. What is the enemy doing and why?

Question 1 was undertaken by the Engineer and the Intelligence Officer, in parallel with Question 2. Key terrain features were marked on a transparent overlay placed on top of a map (such as slow-go areas like forests and rivers), as were the approximate disposition of the enemy forces and likely locations (using translucent stickers with the standard military symbols on them, from APP-6A to NATO standardization agreement on military symbols for Land Based Systems), potential avenues of approach, and likely Courses of Action (CoA). An example is shown in Appendix Figure 2. In this case, it was thought that the enemy assault force was likely to try and meet up with the main armored forces approaching from the West. The enemy had landed in an area surrounded by forest which gave them some protection, although it was thought that they had not landed where they intended.

Q 2. What have I been told to do and why?

The CoS interpreted the orders from Brigade together with the Battle Group commander to complete the Mission Analysis. Each line of the orders was read and the specified and implied tasks were
deduced. These were written by hand onto a whiteboard as shown in Appendix Figure 3. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements (CCIRs, which are linked to the Decision Points in Questions 4 and 5) and Information Requests (IRs) were identified and noted for each task, when appropriate. When the CCIRs/IRs had been derived, the CoS read them off the Mission Analysis whiteboard (expanding where necessary to improve intelligibility) to a clerk who typed them directly onto the Requests For Information (RFI) sheet. The requests were radioed up to Brigade and the responses were tracked on the whiteboard.

Q3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy?

The Battle Group Commander then drew his required effects onto a flip chart as shown in Appendix Figure 4. Three effects were placed above the planning line (SCREEN, CLEAR, and DEFEAT) and four effects were placed below the planning line (SCREEN, DEFEAT, GUARD, and DEFEND). The two SCREEN effects were placed to prevent the enemy from the West coming to the aid of the group who were being attacked. The CLEAR effect was intended to remove any enemy from the forest, if they were there. The DEFEAT effect was intended to incapacitate the enemy.

Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?

The CoS and Battle Group Commander worked on three CoAs to achieve the Commander’s effects as shown in Appendix Figure 5. This was a very quick way to propose and compare three potential CoAs in response to the Battle Group Commander Effects Schematic (remembering that the planning timeline only allowed 17 minutes for each of the 7 questions of the Combat Estimate). Meanwhile the Engineer took the Battle Group Commander’s Effects Schematic and put the Effects onto the ground, using an acetate sheet on a paper map. Each Effect became either a Named Area of Interest
(NAI) or a Target Area of Interest (TAI). Decision Points (DP) were placed between NAI s and TAI s. The resultant overlay is called the Decision Support Overlay (DSO) as shown in Appendix Figure 6. It is worth noting that it took approximately 15 minutes to construct the DSO on the TALC (by the Engineer).

Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?

The Engineer then constructed the Decision Support Overlay Matrix (DSOM) on paper, taking the NAI s, TAI s, and DPs from the paper map and linking them to each other, their location and purpose, and the asset that would be used to achieve the effect. There is a clear link between the NAI s, TAI s and on the hand-written flip chart, as shown in Appendix Figure 7. The manual production of the DSOM on the paper flip chart offers a process of checking the logic of the DSO, making sure that the NAI s, TAI s, and DPs link together and that the assets are being deployed to best effect (i.e., relating each asset to a purpose as the columns are next to each other in the flip chart version of the DSOM).

Q6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?

The CoS led the discussion of how the force elements would move together through the battle (through a mixture of forward recce [reconnaissance], mounted and dismounted troops, and armored vehicles) with logistical support and coordinated indirect fire ahead of them (controlled by the fire control lines—see Q7). This was enacted on the map from the start position to the end position to capture the synchronization issues as shown in Appendix Figure 8, which were recorded onto the Coordination Measures whiteboard as shown in Appendix Figure 9. The coordination measures were used as a precursor to the construction of the synchronization matrix.
Q7. What control measures do I need to impose?

The fire control measures were developed by the Battle Group Commander, to ensure that the indirect fire ordinance would not be placed on the advancing force elements, or beyond the boundaries of the Battle Group’s area. Five fire control lines were drawn onto an overlay on the paper map and numbered one to five. Each line was given a name, which was entered into the staff officer’s notebook against the number used on the overlay as shown in Appendix Figure 10. The convention of naming phase lines was to ensure coordination between the force elements and indirect fire during the operational phase. These activities form the battle plan for the Battle Group. This plan is turned into orders for each of the Companies the Battle Group is directing. Any minor changes to the plan, such as a delay in the timings or a reallocation of a unit (which might become apparent from the updated CCIRs), will mean that a Fragmented Order (FRAGO) is issued to the relevant Company.

Analysis of observed vignette and comparison of media used

The record of the media used in this vignette is presented in Table 1, which indicates a variety of media including paper, maps, overlays, whiteboards, flip charts and staff notebooks (i.e., the shaded cells in Table 1). Observation of the planning process suggests that the Combat Estimate method, media and products work well together. The plan was constructed within the 2 hour time frame, with only 17 minutes per question, and the staff officers had no difficulty using the conventional media. No difficulties were noted working between public and private artifacts, such as taking the effects schematic (Q3) from the flip chart and CoA (Q4) from the flip chart to produce the DSO (Q5) on an overlay. Similarly there were no problems noted for taking the DSO (Q5) from the overlay to produce the DSOM (Q6) on a flip chart. The point here is that translation between the media
was straight-forward, as all media and products were available for the staff officers to use at all times. The planning media and methods were not seen as a constraint on the planning process.

**Table 1. Public and private artifacts used during the planning process**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Media/Products</th>
<th>Paper (private)</th>
<th>Maps/Overlays (public)</th>
<th>Whiteboard (public)</th>
<th>Flip Chart (public)</th>
<th>Staff Notebook (private)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Warning Order</td>
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<tr>
<td>Planning Timeline</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q1. BAE/T1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q2. Mission Analysis</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q2. CCIRs/RFI</td>
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<td>Q3. Effects Schematic</td>
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<td>Q4. COA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q4. DSO</td>
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<td>Q5. DSOM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q6. Co-ordination</td>
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<tr>
<td>Q7. Fire Control</td>
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</table>

The optimal choice of type and mode of communication within and between the cells in a HQ is likely to be heavily dependent on the activity conducted. For some activities a textual document or a graphical image is more appropriate than a spoken alternative or vice-versa. The stage of any activity is also likely to heavily influence the optimal communication approach. Table 2 shows the degree of collaboration and cooperation required for different stages of the planning process. There is a clear divide; the latter stages of the process (Q4-Q7) are best supported by collaboration (actors working individually with shared information). The earlier stages are much
better suited to cooperative activity where the actors work together on one single product. Walker et al. (2009) report on the basic human communication structures seen inside a BG HQ, identifying eight key functions, some of which are comprised of further sub-functions. The eight key functions include the Higher Command Formation, the Battle Group Commander (CO), Chief of Staff (CoS/2IC), the Principal Planning Staff such as the IO/G2 (to varying extents it also requires the participation of individual roles such as Recce/ISTAR, Eng, A2/Log and Arty/AD. There are also other ancillary command staff (such as those responsible for more general tasks and information management), which are called sub-units in the HQ (who typically carry out activities live in the battlespace) and, finally, the collection of graphics and planning aids derived from the Combat Estimate (artifacts that represent and transform information in some manner).

Walker et al. (2009) describe the human network as dynamic with different functional nodes and links becoming active under different activity stereotypes. The activity stereotypes that they identified were: providing direction (i.e., the Battle Group Commander directing communications and information outwards to subordinate staff in a prescribed and tightly coupled manner); reviewing (i.e., the planning/principal staff communicate in a more collaborative manner with mutual exchange of information and ad-hoc usage of planning materials and outputs); and semi-autonomous working (i.e., the headquarters staff are working individually on assigned tasks and become relatively loosely coupled in terms of communication).
Table 2. Team work required for each stage of the planning process

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Digital MP/ BM Estimate Question</th>
<th>Task work or team work</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Q1. What is the enemy doing and why?</td>
<td>Cooperative activity around the table between Intelligence, ISTAR and Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q2. What have I been told to do and why?</td>
<td>Isolated intellectual activity by chief of Staff followed by collaborative activity around the table with other staff officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy?</td>
<td>Isolated intellectual activity by the Commanding Officer followed by cooperative activity around the table with all Staff Officers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/ effect?</td>
<td>Collaborative activity in which the products are shared between Staff Officers led by the Chief of Staff (often the Commanding Officer is physically absent but keeps in touch via radio communications)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/ effect?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q6. Where and when do the actions take place in relation to each other?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Q7. What control measures do I need to impose?</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The communication channels remain open but used in an ad-hoc, unprescribed manner. These basic structures account for most of the formal communications. The human network structure is complex, but some of the links are identified in Figure 2.
As Table 2 and Figure 2 indicate, mission planning is a collaborative (i.e., working together on planning products) and cooperative (i.e., working in parallel on planning products) process, both in terms of the contribution to the products and the verbal interactions. It is also very obvious that the planning team surrounds themselves with the public planning artifacts. Maps, overlays, whiteboards, and flip charts adorn every surface. The plan is constructed in the physical space between these artifacts, as information is collected, transformed and integrated from the cognitive artifacts and the interactions between the members the planning team. The training that planners undergo reinforces the fact that the information needs to be public, for all to see and interact with. In addition, discussion around the artifacts are also public for all in the planning cell to hear. The public nature of the artifacts and discussions is created the conditions for stolen knowledge as proposed by Brown and Duguid (1996), i.e., people working in the periphery can pick-up on what is going on and use the information
in their own work practices. This implicit participation in the planning process can be very beneficial, for the efficient use of information transmission and identification of possible confounds. It was sometimes observed that someone in the periphery would point out a false or incorrect assumption from overhearing or overlooking the public information. The planning process appears to focus on identifying the constraints (such as the mission, the enemy, the environment, the resources, and assets) to help define the possible courses of action. The process also requires an understanding of enemy doctrine and tactics to anticipate their likely behavior and responses as well as military experience to know what effects are likely to achieve the desired outcome. Although it is difficult to quantify, there is certainly the opportunity for creativity in the way in which the plan is constructed. The planning teams are continually trying to identify ways in which they can get the most from their finite resources and assets as well as preventing the enemy from anticipating their strategy. The planning process is also required to be flexible, because it is continuous—as the process of issuing FRAGOs suggests. While there hasn’t been space to discuss the interaction between planning and operations, these two cells are tightly coupled, as operations ensure planning and re-planning are being undertaken in light of the operational demands and constraints. The importance of these issues is mirrored by the Human Factors research literature. Easily interpretable artifacts enable a common interpretation across the team. Such common knowledge, or team schemata, is key for effective team performance (Langan-Fox et al. 2001). In addition to being an important aspect of team performance, team schemata are also tightly coupled to distributed situation awareness (Wilson et al. 2007), itself a core aspect of effective teamwork (Salas et al. 1995). Appropriate team schemata allow teams to engage in effective collaborative and cooperative behaviors (Rasker et al. 2000; Paris et al. 2000; Wilson et al. 2007). Additionally team schemata allow for adaptivity and agility within teams (McCann et al. 2000).
Implications for digitization

Moves have been made to develop digital systems to support the planning processes (see Riley et al. 2006 and Roth et al. 2006 for two examples). The focus of these activities has been on the products of the planning process for distribution between the planning team and to other people in the network within the HQ. The challenge to system designers has been to preserve the collaborative, public, and creative parts of the planning process as well as supporting different levels of plan fidelity (which will depend on the time available to develop the plan). Perhaps the biggest challenge is to decide what needs to be digitized and what form this digitization should take. Given that military planning teams have invested considerable effort in developing and refining their planning skills using the traditional media, it would seem appropriate to try and support these activities rather than requiring them to develop a new set of skills. The planning process has evolved over centuries of refinement and improvement (Clausewitz 1832). Roth et al., argue that much insight may be gleaned from studying the work-arounds and home-grown cognitive artifacts that are being used by command and control teams (such as the so-called cheat-sheets and sticky notes). The traditional analog planning process (as described earlier) is certainly abundant with potential metaphors, such as overlays, stickies, routes, CoAs and so on. It is worth considering if the conventional media could be captured digitally (by camera, scanner, or other means) if they need to be transmitted as electronic documents with orders or reports, or for wider distribution. As a general design principle, the production of electronic documents should be at least as easy as the production of their analog equivalents. Baxter (2005) is wary of the inexorable trend to digitize and concerned by the history of technology failing to deliver expected benefits; this is not just linked to military experience (Stanton and Marsden 1996; Sinclair 2007). Baxter argues that very few people understand the interrelated issues for technology, operations, and human factors (being conversant in just one of these topics is not sufficient).
Transformational approaches are likely to cause more problems than they solve. There are concerns that digitization will lead to additional emergent work (Kuper and Giurelli 2007), both in terms of increasing the amount of direct work required as well as the work associated with operation of the digital tools. The emergent nature of the task-artifact cycle has been described by Carroll (2000). Certainly it will not be possible to predict all the ways in which any future system would be used, so it is important to make the system as flexible as possible so that users may adapt it to suit their purposes (Roth et al. 2006). Kiewiet et al. (2005) noticed that there are marked differences in the planners’ domain knowledge, pointing out that group planning ensures an integrated approach rather than an overemphasis on one planner’s area of strength. The social aspect of planning has not been lost on other researchers (Houghton et al. 2006; Stanton et al. 2006; Walker et al. 2006; Jenkins et al. 2008). The collaborative aspects of planning seem to be a key to successful mission planning. As in the observational case study reported in this article, Riley et al. (2006) identified different cells contributed to the planning process, such as intelligence, operations, logistics, fire support, engineering and air defense. Kuper and Giurelli (2007) argue that design of collaborative tools to support command and control teams is one of the keys to effective team work. The case study presented by Riley et al. (2006) shows how Human Factors can contribute to the design of a mission planning system which is based on a thorough understanding of the planning process, the demands and constraints. In design of their prototype tools they stress the need to provide a quick visualization of the plan and the current situation. This enables the current operational picture to be compared with the plans, which may require changes to the plan as the situation changes (Stanton et al 2008a; Stanton et al. 2008b). The aim of this article was to understand the demands and constraints placed on the people and technology in pursuit of their work, and therefore help design systems that are more appropriate. From these observations two core issues have arisen:
• Artifacts currently used within the planning process are simple and easily understandable ensuring simple interpretation.

• These artifacts are publicly available, allowing collaborative and cooperative planning processes to occur.

These issues should be explored thoroughly before undertaking a digitization of the planning process.

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References


Appendix

Appendix Figure 1. Planning timeline on a flip chart
Appendix Figure 2. Threat integration on map and overlay

Appendix Figure 3. Mission Analysis on a whiteboard
Appendix Figure 4. Effects Schematic drawn on a flip chart and laid on the map

Appendix Figure 5. Effects CoAs developed on a flip chart
Appendix Figure 6. DSO on map and overlay

Appendix Figure 7. DSOM on a flip chart
Appendix Figure 8. Coordination of force elements on map and overlay via a wargame

Appendix Figure 9. Coordination Measures captured on a whiteboard
Appendix Figure 10. Fire control lines on map and overlay also recorded in staff officer’s notebook